On Putin and Nucs
On Putin and Nucs
By Bob Ulin
The worst case scenarios of hundreds of millions dead and widespread destruction would be an unprecedented calamity, but not the end of history. And the power that attains significant strategic superiority is likely to survive the war, perhaps even “win” it by extending its hegemony–at least for a time–over much of the world. Indeed, throughout history there have been leaders who are willing to pay a great cost in national wealth and lives for a chance to take over the world.
Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s. p 96.[1]
While this was written nearly 40 years ago at the height of the Cold War, is this relevant today? The question remains, how far is Vladimir Putin willing to go to achieve his war aims? One must remember that deterrence relies on rational actors in international relations.
I’ve been re-reading Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War and his work cited above. While Herman Kahn wrote about these subjects in the early days of the development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons, I was a special weapons assembler with the 280mm Atomic cannon (1961), a nuclear target planner with Pershing missiles (1975), and finally an arms control policy analyst at NATO headquarters (1989). While my target planning involved sterile mathematics, the application of algorithms, estimating prompt and delayed casualties and physical destruction (battle damage), I was always struck by the fact that if war broke out, I probably would not survive the initial phase of the conflict because I was probably a high-value target because of the weapons systems I worked with and where I was located on the battlefield. I also thought about the effects on the ground of the weapons I was responsible for targeting. When I was a launch control officer with Pershing missiles in Western Germany, I was asked by a visiting member of the press if I would have any hesitation to launch a missile if the authorization came down and the launch code was correct. I responded, “absolutely not.” We all agreed that if the President of the United States authorized a launch of these very destructive weapon systems that meant our country and we were under attack or in extreme danger. Our job was to shoot, move quickly to another concealed position, reload another missile, and await further orders. Rapid movement and concealment were how we survived.
So, back to the Russians and how they see nuclear conflict. I suspect that no nation wants to commit national suicide. This was the rationale for the Cold War policy of Mutual Assured Destruction. In the 34 years since the end of the Cold War and after years of reducing and in some cases eliminating entire classes of nuclear weapons (Pershing missiles, Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, and the Soviet SS-20s were eliminated by the INF Treaty) Europe now finds itself at war with Russia in Ukraine because Vladimir Putin never accepted the demise of the Soviet Union, the loss of national prestige and Russia having been “humiliated” as the loser of the Cold War. Russia, a once substantial imperial military power spanning eleven time zones, is now seen as second-rate power with a third-rate Army that must be rescued by troops from a fourth-rate supporter, the North Korean Army.
Putin has made several pronouncements about the use of nuclear weapons. While he may not want to risk a loss of face on the conventional battlefield, he may prefer to use nucs than to suffer a humiliating defeat. According to Herman Khan, the Soviets did not accept the apocalyptic view of nuclear war. Soviet military writings depict nuclear war as a survivable experience.[2]
Another question is, who is giving Putin advice? Is he surrounded by hardliners or those willing to challenge his assumptions? I think we all know the answer to that question. Nobody wants to be in the position of telling the emperor he has no clothes.
According to Wikipedia, “World War II was the deadliest military conflict in history. An estimated total of 70–85 million people perished, or about 3% of the estimated global population of 2.3 billion in 1940. Deaths directly caused by the war are estimated at 50–56 million, with an additional estimated 19–28 million deaths from war-related disease and famine. Civilian deaths totaled 50–55 million.” As terrible as that war was in blood and treasure, the world survived and rebuilt anew. What is different today is that a nuclear war will likely produce similar devasting results as WWII but only in weeks or months.
Short of giving in to Putin over Ukraine what will it take to end the current conflict without resorting to the use of our most destructive weapons systems? Even if the West gives in again this time, what prevents Putin or his successors from rebuilding, rearming and marching on other countries to fulfill their imperialistic aims? If the only things we have are carrots and sticks, we can rest assured that producing more carrots will not satisfy the Russian appetite.
[1] On Thermonuclear War was originally published by Princeton University Press in 1960.
[2] Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s, by Herman Kahn, p87.