Email Exchange With Harold Sprague
From: Bob Ulin
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2023 4:56 PM
To: Harold Sprague
Subject: RE: ARNSF: NATO Nuclear Posture History and Future
Harold:
First, it was a pleasure meeting you yesterday. I enjoyed our discussion.
I have provided some comments on the issues you cite below. While not an expert on these matters, my long association with NATO coupled with my education and teaching of international relations and arms control informs my responses.
Best,
Bob
From: Harold Sprague
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2023 3:32 PM
To: Bob Ulin
Subject: ARNSF: NATO Nuclear Posture History and Future
Bob,
I enjoyed your ARNSF presentation on NATO’s Nuclear Posture and the background on Able Archer. As I mentioned, my family lived in Verdun, France in 1960. I went to school at the post and my father was posted at Verdun. My mother’s relatives were in Pirmasens, Germany where we spent several holidays.
In 1991 following the USSR collapse and Ukraine voted for independence, Ukraine held about 1,700 nuclear warheads. They opted to give up their nuclear weapons with assurances that if Ukraine was ever attacked with WMD, the treaty would defend Ukraine with WMD which was assured by the Budapest Memorandum.
The 1,700 Ukrainian nuclear weapons went to Mayak in Russia for demil and the fissile materials were placed in the Russian Fissile Material Storage Facility (RFMSF) which was commissioned in 2003 and began storing plutonium in 2004. The RFMSF designer for DTRA was Black & Veatch where I was working at the time. The general Mayak facility has had almost 30 major accidents involving nuclear materials.
[RU] Thank you, this is interesting. I did not know that Black and Veatch was involved in this effort.
Some issues I wanted to speak with you about include:
1. If Russia attacks Ukraine with tactical nucs, does the Budapest Memorandum obligate the US to respond with tactical nuclear weapons?
[RU] First the word obligate is difficult. All obligations are voluntary as is membership within the Alliance. After 9/11 when the Alliance decided to support the U.S. against its enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan some states decided not to send troops. Others set conditions for the use of their forces in-country. Some restricted their forces from being used in offensive operations. Such is the nature of a voluntary alliance. As such there is no obligation for us to do anything we choose not to do. Secondly, I do not believe that the Budapest Memorandum has the force of a treaty if not confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
2. Would a Russian retaliation trigger NATO article 6?
[RU] As you know Article 5 states that an attack on one is considered an attack on all member states. While Article 6 defines the geographical areas covered by the treaty. For instance, Guam is a U.S. Territory, if Guam was attacked by the Chinese, that would be an attack on the United States, a signatory to the NATO Treaty. Guam is certainly a long way from the North Atlantic.
3. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was abrogated by Russia and there is no INF treaty with China. Should there be an INF treaty?
[RU] Yes, but not just INF but strategic weapons as well. Intermediate range nuclear weapons are defined as having a range of 620–3,400 mi (1,000–5,500 km). I believe that treaties are important because they get the parties to discuss the issues and help us understand how each views a specific concern. However, it does not make sense to limit some nuclear powers (the U.S. and Russia) while ignoring others (e.g. China and North Korea). Strategic stability requires that all states possessing such weapons be limited to some extent. One key problem is that states with small nuclear stockpiles do not wish to be dictated to by states with larger stockpiles because it limits them to perpetual inferiority.
4. The B61-12 limits the US response regarding tactical nuclear weapons to aerial delivery. Should the US go back to a Pershing style ground launched intermediate range tactical nuclear weapon to counter the Russian SS-26 Iskander?
[RU] Makes sense to me but there’s no appetite to re-open production lines that no longer exist. It would just rekindle the nuclear arms race. Besides, our ballistic missile submarines can get close enough to shore to make accurate strikes against most targets worth destroying. In my estimation, I believe that further development of submarine launched hypersonic cruise missiles that have sufficient range and speed to limit their time of flight, will give our adversaries pause and their delivery platforms are better protected.
Regards,
Harold Sprague